

Ministerial Artifice
1608/325
DETECTED,

OR, A FULL

ANSWER

TO

A PAMPHLET lately published, Intituled,
*The Interests of the Empress Queen, the Kings of
FRANCE and SPAIN, &c. betrayed in the Preliminary
Articles at AIX-LA-CHAPELLE.*



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Ministerial Artifice

D E T E C T E D.

IN Politicks there are two sorts of Arts daily practised by Ministers, the Art of *governing*, and the Art of *deceiving* the People; the former by *wise Men*, who know how to *govern*, and are therefore rarely forc'd to *deceive*; the latter by *weak Men*, who do not know how to *govern*, and are therefore always forc'd to *deceive*. Of this last sort, a more glaring Instance has not of late Years appeared, than the Pamphlet under my Consideration. The *Discount* to which *last Winter's Subscription* had fallen, and the yet greater *Discount* it was like to fall to, by some of our Ministers endeavouring to make *a Job of it*, reduc'd them to the Necessity of accepting a Peace upon any Terms, in order to save themselves and their Friends from *that Ruin* with which they were threatned, by their not being able to *comply* with the *payments* upon those *vast Sums* they had subscrib'd, in hopes of *selling out at an advanc'd Price*, before the *Second or Third Payment* came due.

This was their Motive, and this, I say, was their only Motive for submitting to *Preliminaries*, which even they had but half a Year before rejected with Disdain. When they thus found themselves under a Necessity to accept of such *Preliminaries*, they foresaw, tho' their Foresight was never thought extraordinary, that the People of this Kingdom would be apt to find Fault with *any Peace* that could be the Effect of *such Preliminaries*. For this Reason, all the *cunning Fellows* in their Pay, and God knows they are not many, were set to work, to contrive Methods for deceiving the good People of

England, so far at least as to make them *believe* the Peace good, till they should be convinc'd of the contrary, *by feeling its Effects*. At last some one of these Tools, more lucky, or, perhaps, better paid than the rest, for present Pay is the *Apollo* of all their *Poets*, and the *Mercury* of all their *Politicians*; I say, at last some one of them hit upon this Expedient, that a Pamphlet should be wrote in *French*, highly reflecting upon the *Preliminaries*, as dishonourable to the House of *Bourbon*, and injurious to the Kingdoms of *France* and *Spain*; and to make this pass for the genuine Production of Marshal Count de *Saxe's* Friends, these *Preliminaries* were likewise to be represented as injurious to him, and to the Empress Queen of *Hungary*.

The Plan being thus laid, it was whispered about, and I remember to have heard, above *three* or *four Months* ago, that such a Pamphlet had been wrote, and sent to the Press at *Liege*; but that the *French* had got Notice of it, and had, *without asking leave*, sent a Body of their *Archers* into the City of *Liege*, and not only seiz'd the Impression, but also the Author. To this it was added, that several Letters had been seiz'd in the Author's Custody, from which it appear'd, that he was set on, and furnished with Materials by *Marshal Count Saxe*; but however, that one of our great and wise Ministers abroad had found Means, by his extraordinary Intelligence, to procure a Copy of it, which he had sent to his Friend, one of our great and wise Ministers here at Home. Another Circumstance was added, that the unfortunate Author was a *Jew*, which, indeed, even at that time, made me suspect something of a Forgery.

Whether such a Pamphlet was printed at *Liege*, and seiz'd by the *French*, together with the Author, is what I shall not pretend to determine; for supposing this Fact to be true, I am persuaded, that
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it was not wrote by the Order, or with the Connivance of *Marſhal Count Saxe*, or any *French* Miniſter whatever ; and I am further perſuaded, that no Man would attempt to write and publiſh ſuch a Pamphlet Abroad, without ſome high Support. It is impoſſible to ſuppoſe, that any *French* or *Spaniſh* Miniſter would be at the Expence of getting ſuch a Pamphlet wrote and printed ; becauſe in abſolute Monarchies an Appeal to the People, as all Pamphlets muſt be underſtood to be, is deemed one of the higheſt Affronts that can be offered to the Sovereign : For the ſame Reason we cannot ſuppoſe, that it was wrote at the Inſtigation of the Republick of *Genoa* : From the Nature of it, we cannot preſume the Court of *Vien^a*, or the King of *Sardⁿa* gave any Encouragement to its being wrote or publiſh'd ; and therefore we muſt conclude, that this Pamphlet muſt be the Production of ſome *Engliſh* or *Dutch* Miniſter. As to the *Dutch*, conſidering the Danger they were in, and the real Advantages that ſeem to be ſtipulated for them by theſe *Preliminaries*, their *new* Miniſters had no occaſion for being at any Expence in *deceiving* them ; and they knew that their Party in *Holland* would be fond of any Peace that ſhould free them from the imminent Danger they were expos'd to, and eſtabliſh them in the Poſſeſſion of that Power, which the ridiculous *Middle-way* Conduct of their *Predeceſſors*, and the *Madneſs* of the *Mob* had put into their Hands.

Every unbias'd Reader will therefore, in my Opinion, conclude, that the Author was ſet on by ſome *Engliſh* Miniſter, and rewarded with a large Sum of *Engliſh* Money in Hand, beſides great Promiſes *in futuro* ; and this he will be confirmed in by the Stile and Manner in which it is wrote. When I firſt heard of it, I remember, I aſk'd the Right Honourable Perſon who told me of it, whether he had read it ; and upon his telling me
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he had, I supposed that it fell foul upon our Conduct, and made that the chief Reason why the *French* should have continued the War; because from such Conduct they had every thing to hope, and nothing to fear. No such thing answers his —, he does not say a Word against our Conduct, but ascribes their whole Success to the Providence of God, which had so plainly manifested itself in the late Events of the War. Upon this I began to suspect the Anvil on which this Piece had been forged; and that it would, at a proper Season, be printed and publish'd here in *England*: Tho' good Manners prevented my expressing such Suspicions to a Person of high Rank, who, I knew, had a very close Connect on with the principle Persons at the Helm of Affairs in this Kingdom.

What Men usually call the Providence of God Almighty, or the Blessing of God upon the r Arms, in or er, from thence, to draw an Argument for the Justice of their Cause, I shall not scruple to call, *The Fortune of War*; and *the Fortune of War* is so fickle, that it can never be a good Argument for a Nation's continuing a War, when it can have reasonable Terms of Peace: But the *bad Conduct* of our Enemies, and Success flowing from that Cause, is so substantial a Reason for our insisting upon high Terms, that I am sure the Argument would not have been left wholly untouch'd by any *Frenchman*, who really designed to shew, that his Countrymen ought not to have agreed to the late *Preliminaries* for a Peace. This Neglect is so manifest a Proof of the Pamphlet's being design'd for some other Purpose, that if I had been to advise such a Pamphlet as this, and for such a Purpose as this was really, I believe, designed for, I should have advised *some Reflections upon our Conduct*, in order to prevent any Suspicion of the true Design; but this, it seems, our wise Ministers could not bear, because it was, I suppose, *bitting them on the sore Heel*.

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Another strong Proof of this Pamphlet's being wrote with a Design to *impose upon and deceive* the good People of *England*, is the critical Time at which it makes its publick Appearance in the World. If it had been wrote at the Instigation of any one but an *English* Minister, and the whole Impression seized, in such an *illegal Manner* by the *French*, how came our Ministers to get a Copy of it? For where the Impression was, there I suppose was the original Copy also; and though that Branch of our publick Expence called *secret Service Money*, is always very extraordinary, especially if we include the 30000 *l.* allowed to each of our principal Secretaries of State for that Purpose, yet it is well known, that a much greater Part of it is employed against the *domestick Enemies* of the *Administration*, than against the *foreign Enemies* of the *People*, therefore it is not very probable, that our Ministers could get a Copy of a Pamphlet, which none of the other Ministers could come at; and I must presume, that if the Imperial Ministers could have come at a Copy, it would long since have been published abroad, and soon after republished in *England*. But the *French* had, it seems, so effectually demolished the Press, the Impression, and the original Copy, and so well secured the Author, though in a City where they had *no Jurisdiction*, that no one Copy could be met with, except that which was procured by our active and diligent Minister at *Aix la Chapelle*; and this Copy has been so closely kept, that it could never see the Light, till *a few Days after the definitive Treaty was signed, and a few Weeks before the Meeting of the British Parliament.*

This to me is a convincing Proof, that our Ministers had a Copy of it before it was sent to the Press, that some of them were the Cause of its being sent to the Press, and perhaps the Cause of the Impression's

Impression's being seized by the *French*, in order to render it the more authentick, and the more ardently sought after. As long as the Terms of the Peace they had made, could be concealed, they had no Occasion for any public Vindication of them, but as those Terms, whatsoever they are, cannot now be long concealed, this Pamphlet is sent out to the World, in order to convince us, that this Peace is a most dishonourable and disadvantageous one for the House of *Bourbon*, and consequently a good one for *England*

So much for the true Design of this Pamphlet, and now I shall proceed to examine the Arguments which the Author makes use of for shewing, that the *Preliminaries*, supposing them to be such as were published, were dishonourable and disadvantageous for the House of *Bourbon*. In general I must allow, that the Author has play'd the Part he was to act very tolerably, except in that of not talking contemptibly of our Conduct, and highly extolling the Conduct of his Countrymen. In every Page, he assumes the *Frenchman*, and never sticks at asserting the most glaring Falshoods, when he thinks, they will serve his Purpose. According to this Method, he begins with a most notorious one: He says, that the Kingdoms of *France* and *Spain* were *in the most happy and flourishing Condition, and had every Circumstance decisive in their Favour*, when the Negotiations, for a Peace, were begun. Can any one agree to this, who considers the interior Circumstances either of *France* or *Spain*? With regard to the latter, it is very well known, that the Kingdom of *Spain* has, for many Years past, been drained both of Men and Money, for supporting the ambitious Projects of its Queen-Consort, now Queen-dowager, in *Italy*.—'Tis true, they got some Years ago, by the Pusillanimity, or something worse, of our then Minister, one of their Royal
 Infants

Infants established in the Kingdom of the *Two Sicilies*. But was this of any Advantage to *Spain*? On the contrary it has always been an Incumbrance, for they have been ever since, and will probably for many years to come, be obliged to maintain an Army of *Spanish* Troops there, for supporting their Royal Infant in his new acquired Kingdom; and the present War has shewn, that it can be of no Service to them in any War they happen to be engaged in.

Besides this, their Returns of Treasure from *Mexico* and *Peru*, which is the principal Support both of the Crown and People of *Spain*, had been very much interrupted, and a great part of it intercepted, by the War-ships of this Nation: Their Commerce had been entirely ruined, and their *American* Settlements supplied with all Sorts of Commodities they wanted, by Means of the contraband Trade, which had been opened by our destroying their Forts at *Porto-Bello* and *Chagra*, and preventing their *Guarda Costa*'s from daring to look out of their Harbours; so that not only the King lost his *Indulto*, but his Subjects all the Profits, upon the Goods which formerly used to be sent out and brought Home by their *Galleons* and *Register-Ships*, and by them only: And these Misfortunes were daily growing upon them, in Proportion as this Nation began to find out the true use, and to make a proper Application, of its superior Force at Sea and in *America*.

In these Circumstances can any one but a *Frenchman*, or one who assumes the *Frenchman*, say, that the Kingdom of *Spain* was *in the most happy and flourishing Condition*; and then with Regard to the interior Condition of *France*, the Falshood is still more glaring. Their Commerce, which was the Support of their Armies, was very near ruined,

and in one Year more would have been absolutely undone: Their Navy was destroyed without any Hopes of restoring it, during the War: Their Plantations both in *South* and *North America*, were upon the Point of giving themselves up to any Nation that could give them daily Bread, and consequently to this Nation only: Their Country was so exhausted of Men, that it was with Difficulty they made their last Levies: Their *Noblesse*, who, in that Country, serve in their Armies at their own proper Expence, were reduced almost to the last Penny, by the long Continuance and Expence of the War: Their Poor were loaded with such heavy Taxes as raised dangerous Insurrections in several Parts of the Kingdom: Their Merchants were, every Day, breaking for *Millions of French Livres*; and to conclude all, their People were starving for want of Bread, which they could no way have but by the *Assistance* or *Permission* of *England*.

These were the interior Circumstances of *France*, at the Time the late Negotiations for a Peace were entered upon at *Aix-la-Chapelle*, and from these let any one judge whether that Kingdom was then in the most happy and flourishing Condition. Now as to the Situation of these two Kingdoms with regard to Foreign Affairs, and first I shall consider the Situation of *Spain*. I have already observed, that the Kingdom of *Spain* had, for many Years, been drained both of its Men and Money by the ambitious Projects of its *Queen Consort*, or rather *Queen Regent*, to which I shall add, that it had been at the same time, made the *Cat's Paw* by *France*, for interrupting the Trade and Commerce of *England*. By these means the *Spaniards* had been, for many Years, in almost a continual State of War with those two Powers, whose Friendship they ought to court with the greatest Assiduity. When I say

say this, I believe every Man but a *Frenchman*, or an *Italianized Spaniard* will suppose I mean the House of *Austria* and *England*. As *Spain* is not by itself alone a Match for *France*, either by Sea or Land, the *Spaniards* must court an Alliance with the House of *Austria*, for supporting them by Sea, against *France*; for unless they do this, their Crown must become *absolutely dependent* upon the Crown of *France*, which is the only Nation that can attack them by Land, and a Nation that is powerful enough to subdue them in two or three Campaigns, should none of the other Powers of *Europe* come to their Relief, and none of them they could expect, if both *England* and the House of *Austria* should refuse to be of the Party; therefore it is the true Interest of *Spain*, not only to cultivate a continual Friendship and Alliance with the House of *Austria* and *England*, but to be as jealous as any other State in *Europe* of any *Addition* or *Increase* to the Power or Dominions of *France*.

This, I say, is the *true Interest* of *Spain*, and it is hardly possible this Interest should be interrupted by any *contrary Interest*; for neither Ambition nor Interest can ever tempt the House of *Austria* to fall out with *Spain*; if the Latter forms no Schemes of Conquest or Establishment in *Italy*, which the *Spaniards* never will, if directed by their own Interest only; because the making and supporting such Conquests or Establishments, will always cost them more than they can bring in, and what is much worse for *Spain*, they will drain them of their People, which that Kingdom can less spare than any other Country in *Europe*. Then with Regard to *England*, it is certain that *England* will never attempt to make any Conquests upon *Spain* in *Europe*, and very improbable they should ever at-

tempt any such Thing in *America* ; the only Cause of Contest therefore that can ever arise between the two Nations, must proceed from the *English* Possession of *Port-mahon* and *Gibraltar*, and what the *Spaniards* call the *Contraband Trade* in *America*. As to *Port-mahon* and *Gibraltar*, their being in the Possession of *England* will always be of Advantage to *Spain*, by keeping the *French* in awe, and preventing their usurping the *Dominion of the Mediteranean* ; and it never can be of any real Detriment to the Crown or People of *Spain*, because it is so easy to prevent the carrying on of any smuggling Trade between *Gibraltar* and the Southern Part of their Dominions. And as to the *Contraband Trade* in *America*, *England* has always been willing to allow the *Spaniards* to prevent it by any Method consistent with her Trade and Navigation in the *American Seas*, and by such Methods it may be almost entirely prevented ; so that if ever any Contest happens between the two Nations upon this Account, it must be the fault of *Spain*, and not of *England*.

From this Explanation of the *true Interests* of *Spain*, it is evident, that in the present War the *Spaniards* found themselves in Alliance with the *only State* in *Europe*, whose *Increase of Power* they have Reason to dread, and at War with the *only two States* in *Europe*, whose Power they can trust to, for preserving the Independency of their Monarchy. Can this be said to be a Circumstance decisive in favour of that Kingdom ? Can such a Falshood be asserted by any Man but a *Frenchman*, or one who assumes that Character ?

The Circumstances of *France*, with regard to Foreign Affairs, come next under my Consideration ; and tho', in the present War, that Nation had, by the unaccountable Misconduct of its Enemies, met with extraordinary Success in *Flanders*, yet the Circumstances

cumstances of *Europe* were far from being favourable for them : and to demonstrate this I must observe, that as *France* is superior at Land to any one of its Neighbours upon the Continent of *Europe*, the only thing they have to fear, is a *strong Confederacy* against them ; and to prevent this, will always be *the governing Maxim* of every prudent *French* Minister. From the mutual Contests that often arise among the other Powers of *Europe*, a Conjunction may happen when *France* may see it almost impossible to form a sufficient Confederacy against her ; and then, *indeed*, she may give her Ambition *its full Scope*. Such a Conjunction did actually happen, by the Obstinacy of the Court of *Vienna*, upon the Death of the Emperor *Charles* the VIth. and *France* did accordingly endeavour to make the proper Advantage of it ; but by the *good Conduct* of the Queen of *Hungary's* Ministers and Generals, or rather by the *bad Conduct* of the *French* their Schemes were at last disappointed. Their Armies were drove out of *Germany*, with the Loss of above 65000 Men of their *best Veteran* Troops, as I have been certainly informed, by those who had an Opportunity to know the Truth : They were deserted by all the Princes, their Allies, in *Germany* : Their Allies, the *Swedes*, were forc'd to submit to a Peace with the *Muscovites* : At last, their greatest Enemy was chosen *Emperor of Germany* ; and the Empire, with great Difficulty, kept from declaring War against them. Thus they lost the best Opportunity that ever offered for carrying their ambitious Projects into Execution ; and from that Moment every wise Man in *France* saw, that a Peace was become necessary for them ; because, by bad Success in the War, they were in Danger of being undone ; and by good Success, they would be brought into that Danger which it is their cheif Maxim to avoid, to wit, a *powerful Confederacy* against them.

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- This last Danger would certainly have been brought upon them, long before last Winter, if either *the late Magistracy in Holland* had done their Duty, or if what was said to have been the Advice of a late Minister in *England*; had been followed; so that the *French Success* in the *Netherlands*, and the *Salvation* of their Commerce and Colonies, were rather owing to the *Misconduct* of their *Enemies*, than to their own Power, or *the Chance of War*; and in this Respect they saw, that a very material Change had been begun, and carried a great Length, by the Beginning of last Winter. The Form of Government, as well as the Magistracy in *Holland* had been changed; those that were Friends to *France* in that Country, had been, or were in a fair way of being every one *outed*, and such Men brought into Power as would, in all Probability, act with the utmost Vigour against *France*; and in *England* they had begun to exert the Power of their matchless Navy in a proper manner, and had at last apply'd in an effectual manner to the Empire of *Russia*; by which means that powerful Empire was become a Party in the Confederacy against the *French*, and thereby the Influence of their Friends in *Germany* began to dwindle.

But this was not all: The *French* had still a greater Misfortune to struggle with. In *Italy* it was hardly possible for them to push the War with any Success, because their Enemies were Masters of the Sea; and this they knew very well, tho' they made a Shew of pushing it there, in order to keep the Court of *Spain* in good Humour; as they had no Navy, they could not make any Attack upon *England*; nor could they attack the *German* Dominions of the Empress Queen of *Hungary*; and if they pursued their Attack upon the *United Provinces* with Success, they were almost sure of bringing the *Germanick* Body into the Confederacy against them.

them. Thus, I think it is evident, that the *French* were in the Situation I have mentioned : By bad Success they were in Danger of immediate Ruin ; by good Success they were in Danger of raising a Confederacy against them, by which they would at last, in all human Probability, be undone, and will any one say that this was a Circumstance decisive in their Favour ?

Against such a Confederacy as would probably have been the Effect of the *French* pursuing their Success against *Holland*, they had no *Christian* Resource : They might have made their Application to the *Ottoman* Empire, and it is confidently asserted they did ; but from the Reception it met with, they had no Hopes of any Assistance from thence ; and the Behaviour of that Empire, during the War in Queen *Ann*'s time, was a Proof that *France* can never depend upon the *Ottoman* Power for saving her from Perdition ; therefore, when she finds herself defeated in any of her ambitious Views, and a powerful Confederacy formed, or like to be formed against her, she has no certain Resource but that of concluding a Peace upon the best Terms she can get. This has been the Conduct of the Court of *France*, ever since Cardinal *Richlieu* establish'd the Power, and gave Birth to the Ambition of that Crown. This was the Cause of the Peace at *Aix-la-Chapelle* in 1668, of the Peace at *Nimeguen* in 1679, of the Peace at *Ryswick* in 1697, and of that at *Utrecht* in 1713, which last had been long fought for, and at last, by Chance, obtain'd by *France* ; at all which Treaties the *French* made great Concessions, but not so great as they might have been forc'd to, had the Confederates known their Strength, and been faithful to each other ; and it is to be fear'd, that the Case will now appear to be the same, with respect to this second Treaty at *Aix-la-Chapelle* ; for if the *French* be allowed to begin a
War,

War, as often as the Circumstances of *Europe* furnish them with a favourable Opportunity to make Conquests, before any Confederacy can be formed against them, and always to retain some Part of those Conquests by the ensuing Treaty of Peace; their Monarchy will at last grow so great and powerful, that it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to form a sufficient Confederacy against them.

This which makes the first Paragraph of my sham *French* Author's Introduction, I thought necessary to discuss in a full and ample manner; because, through his whole Performance, he takes what he thus, like a true *Frenchmen*, asserts for granted, and argues as if the *French*, at the Beginning of this last Summer, had the Ball at their Foot, and might prescribe what Terms they pleas'd to their Enemies; whereas it will, I think, appear from what I have said, that the *French*, notwithstanding their Success in the *Netherlands*, ran the greatest Risk by the Continuance of the War, and consequently that instead of prescribing, they might have been prescribed to by their Enemies, if the confederated Negotiators at *Aix-la-Chapelle* had known the true State of *Europe*, and had not allowed themselves to be biaßed by any private and selfish Considerations.

I shall give myself no Trouble about any other Paragraph of my sham *Frenchman's* Introduction except the last, where, he says, it is of the utmost Consequence even to the Nations confederated against the House of *Bourbon* to cement a solid Peace, and a sincere and perfect Reconciliation, between them and that House. So far we agree: With him I am of Opinion, that this is of the utmost Consequence, not only to the Nations now confederated against that House, but to all the Nations in *Europe*; but then we differ as to the Means. He
says,

says, that the Way to do this, is to prevent the Heads of that House from ever having Occasion to repent the immense Sacrifices which, by their natural Magnanimity and Moderation, they may be induced to make for a Peace; because, says he, a Peace bought too dear can never long continue. Now, I say, that the only Way of coming at this salutary End, is not to trouble our Heads about their having Occasion to repent, or to expect any Thing from their Moderation or Magnanimity, which has never yet appeared to any one but a *Frenchman*, but to compel them to make such Concessions as shall leave them no Room for Repentance, and for that Purpose not only to form, but to preserve such a Confederacy in *Europe*, as shall keep the Heads, or at least the principal Head of that House always in Terror; for from long Experience we may learn, that the principal Head of that House never made Peace, till he was compelled to do so by a powerful Confederacy being formed against him, and always treacherously broke it as soon as he found himself free from the Fear of any such Confederacy.

To prove this I shall give a brief History of the *French Wars* and Treaties for near a Century past. In the Year 1664, the *French* having found Means to kindle a War between *England* and *Holland*, and being thereby freed from the Dread of a powerful Confederacy against them, they took that Opportunity to attack the *Netherlands* then in Possession of *Spain*, and conquered a great Part of them; but the King of *England* having not only made Peace with *Holland*, but formed what was called the tripple League between *England*, *Holland*, and *Sweden*, for the Preservation of the *Netherlands*, the *French* were forced to agree to a Peace at *Aix-la-Chapelle*, whereby they agreed to restore the greatest Part of what they had conquered in the

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Netherlands, which Restitution or Sacrifice was not owing to their Magnanimity or Moderation, but the Fear they were under, that *Spain*, with the Assistance of the *Emperor*, and of the said tripple *League*, would soon have been able to take all back again, and to make them pay dear for the unjust Invasion they had made. However, they, at that Time, took Care to reserve, and the unseasonable Aversion of *England* and *Holland* to a War allowed them to reserve the Towns and Places of *Charleroy*, *Binch*, *Aeth*, *Fort de Searp*, *Oudenard*, *Lisle*, *Armentiers*, *Courtray*, *Bergues*, and *Furnes*, with their Dependencies.

Again in 1672, they found means to kindle a new War between *England* and *Holland*, and being thus again set free from the Dread of any Confederacy against them, they not only made themselves Masters of most of the *Spanish Netherlands*, but were very near making a Conquest of the *united Provinces*. This, very justly, raised the Jealousy of *England*, so that the Parliament prevailed with the King to clap up a Peace with the *Dutch*; and the King of *Spain*, the *Emperor*, and at last the whole *Germanick Body*, having declared War against the *French*, they began to be afraid, that the King of *England*, would join the Confederacy against them, because in the Beginning of the Year 1678, he recalled his Forces out of their Service, and actually entered into a defensive Alliance with the *Dutch*. It was the Dread of this, and not any Magnanimity or Moderation in the *French*, that obliged them to agree to a Peace at *Nimeguen*, by which they restored many Places they had conquered; but here again they took Advantage of the *Dutch* Fondness for Peace, and the King of *England*'s Aversion to War, by which Means they got leave to reserve the whole Province called *Franche Compte*, besides a great many Towns and Places

Places in the *Netherlands*, the City of *Friburg* in *Germany*, and several Places in *Lorain*.

As this Peace at *Nimeguen* put an End to the Confederacy then subsisting against *France*, and destroyed all Confidence amongst the several Powers concerned in it, because the *Dutch* first deserted their Allies by concluding at that Congress, a separate Treaty for themselves, the *Spaniards* next, and then the *Emperor*, so that the King of *Denmark* and Elector of *Brandenburg* being thus by all the rest of the Confederates left in the Lurch, it produced most terrible Consequences ; for these two Princes being left at the Mercy of *France* and *Sweden*, they were obliged to purchase a Peace, by a Surrender of all the Conquests they had made upon the *Swedes*, and were so irritated against their former Allies, that they entered into a close Friendship and Alliance with *France*, which gave the *French* Ambition its full Swing. The very next Year after they had concluded this Peace at *Nimeguen* they seized in a violent Manner upon the Imperial City of *Strasbourg*, and set up what they called their Chambers of Reunion at *Metz*, *Bisanzon* and *Brisack*. These three new erected Courts were to enquire and decide what Territories or Places in *Germany* ever belonged to any Place then possessed by *France* ; and by Virtue of their Decisions, which were directed by the Court of *Versailles*, that Court seized by force of Arms upon whatever Places in *Germany* it pleased.

But this was not all : They then formed the Project of getting the *Dauphin* elected King of the *Romans* ; and to effect this they concluded, that the best Way would be to get the *Turk* to attack the *Emperor*, and, if possible, to draw their Arms into *Germany*, in order to force the Princes of the *Empire* to apply to them for Relief, which they were

resolved not to grant but upon Condition of the *Dauphin's* being chosen King of the *Romans*; and in this they had succeeded, if it had not been for that brave Prince *John Sobieski*, King of *Poland* *; for in 1682, the *Turks* invaded *Hungary* with an Army of 200,000 Men, and the *Emperor* having no Army sufficient for opposing their Progress, they pursued their Conquests with such Rapidity, that by the 15th of *July* 1683, they had advanced to and formed the Siege of *Vienna*. If they could have made themselves Masters of this Capital, it is highly probable, that both the *Emperor* and *Empire* must have applied to the *French* for Succour, and in that Case the *Dauphin* would have been elected King of the *Romans*, which would have established that universal Monarchy they have been long aiming at; but the above-mentioned King of *Poland*, at the Head of a fine Army of *Polish* Troops, having joined the Imperial Army under the brave Duke of *Lorain* †, they attacked the *Turks*, and raised the Siege on the 12th of *September*, after a most bloody Battle, in which, and in the Siege, it was computed the *Turks* lost 85000 Men of their best Troops; and the Flower of their Army being thus destroyed, the *Emperor* had such Success against them for some Years after, that he might perhaps have returned them the Compliment by besieging *Constantinople*; but as the *French* had nothing to fear from the then King of *England*, who thought of nothing but converting his People to *Poper*y, they broke into *Germany* in 1688 with a numerous Army, without any Pretence whatsoever, and might then have had a good Chance for accomplishing their ambitious Views, if it had not been for the surprisngly sudden and unexpected Revo-

* Great Grandfather to the young Man, who lately made such a Fracas in this Island.

† Grandfather to the present Emperor.

lution in *England*, by which a new Confederacy was formed against them, and this at last forced them to conclude a Peace at *Ryswick* in 1697, by which they restored a great many Places they had possessed themselves of, but reserved the important City of *Strasbourg* and several other Places, especially in the *Netherlands*.

Their seizing upon the *Spanish* Monarchy in 1700, notwithstanding the many Engagements they were under, not to attempt any such thing, proceeded from the same Cause; but here I must confess, that the ridiculous *Treaties of Partition* furnished them with a better Pretence than they have usually had for attacking their Neighbours: However, this produced such a Confederacy against them, as had very near brought them to the Ruin they deserved, and made them keep quiet for twenty Years after the Treaty of *Utrecht*. But no sooner had they recovered, than they began again to think of disturbing the Peace of *Europe*; and the Disputes that had happened about the *Ostend* Company, and about some Territories in *Germany*, having furnished them with an Assurance, that no Confederacy could be soon formed against them, they suddenly attacked the *Emperor* towards the End of 1733, both upon the *Rhine* and in *Italy*; but being disappointed in their Design upon *Poland*, and a Body of *Russian* Troops having marched to the *Rhine* against them, they began to be afraid of the Confederacy formed between the *Emperor* and *Empire*, the new King of *Poland* and the *Empress* of *Russia*, and therefore they readily agreed to a Peace, by which they restored many Places they had conquered, but reserved to themselves the Dutchies of *Lorain* and *Bar*, and to a Branch of their House the Kingdom of the *Two Sicilies*.

From

From this short History of the Wars and Treaties which the *French* have made for *near a Century* past, it appears to be the established Maxim of their Monarchy, to make War as often as the Circumstances of *Europe* furnisheth them with an Assurance, that no sufficient Confederacy can presently be formed against them, and to agree to a Peace upon the best Terms they can get, as soon as they find such a Confederacy formed, or in a way of being formed against them; and what I have already observed will shew, that this is the most prudent Maxim they can follow; because it will, by Degrees, increase the Power of the House of *Bourbon*, so that it will become at last very difficult, if not impossible, to form a sufficient Confederacy against them. This is therefore a general and unanswerable Argument for proving, that the late *Preliminaries*, supposing them to be what have been published, were neither dishonourable nor disadvantageous for the House of *Bourbon*, or any Branch thereof, but founded upon a Maxim which they have invariably pursued for *near a Century* past, and the most prudent Maxim they can establish as the Rule of their Conduct: And in the Second Part of this Discourse, which shall be published as soon as possible, I shall examine the particular Arguments brought by my *sham Frenchman*, for deceiving the *good People* of this Kingdom.

F I N I S.



